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Abstract
This study evaluates the potential surplus gain of a water improvement policy and the causal eﬀects of its
components on choice probabilities for the floating people on Inlay Lake, Myanmar, based on a randomized
conjoint field experiment. In our experimental design, respondents rank three options: two alternative policies
and one status quo. We then present a method that enables us to estimate the minimum willingness-to-pay
for a policy in the form of compensating variations under a set of weak assumptions using this conjoint data.
Results show inter alia that the provision of toilet facilities and a collective wastewater treatment, and joint
implementation of the policy by the government and local NGOs have a positive eﬀects on the choice probabilities.
Results also show that the surplus gain from a water-quality improvement policy is at least as large as 22.9% of
the average annual per-capita income of those on the lake.
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1 Introduction
Envirodevonomics argues underscore of field measurements of the marginal willingness-to-pay for improvements in
environmental quality in developing countries, mainly due to market failure (Greenstone and Jack 2015). Well-
informed respondents, with their higher availability of credit and clear property rights, would likely enhance their
investment for a better environment. There are also potential challenges with regard to measurement errors and
biases in field experiments on stated preferences in developing countries (Whittington 1998, Durand-Rorat et al.
2015). Nevertheless, considering their significance in terms of future global environmental sustainability and sustain-
able development, additional empirical evidence is needed from developing countries to improve our understanding
of these diﬃculties. Therefore, this study provides new empirical findings in the emerging field of Envirodevonomics.
Here, we conduct a non-parametric analysis of welfare gains, using primary data from a conjoint field experiment
on hypothetical water quality improvement programs for Inlay Lake, Myanmar. The objective of the study is to
show that the willingness-to-pay and the welfare gain are significantly high if a water quality improvement pro-
gram is implemented, where both pollution control and conservation of natural resources of the lake are considered
(Perrings, 2014). Note that this study does not directly quantify the willingness-to-pay for improvements in water
quality, but rather the willingness-to-pay for policy programs that aim to improve water quality.
In our experimental design, respondents rank three options in terms of their personal preference: two water
quality improvement programs and one that maintains the status quo. Each program is characterized by multiple
attributes. These include the financial burden, program period, type of implementer, and additional services, such
as the provision of a toilet system, collective water treatment of manufacturing wastewater, garbage collection, and
an agriculture assistant that provides standardized optimal inputs of organic fertilizer and/or pesticide. This study
provides two types of estimators. The first type is the causal eﬀects of policy attributes on the probability that
individuals choose a policy program. This probability can be interpreted as the extent of the public support for the
policy program. Our results show that among additional services, toilet provision has the largest positive impact
on public support. Additionally, we find that people prefer programs implemented jointly by the government and
local NGOs, rather than by the government on its own. The second type of estimator is the willingness-to-pay for
a water quality improvement program. We show that the lower bounds of the willingness-to-pay can be estimated
non-parametrically from our experiment data, and that the lower bound of the surplus gain is considerably large
(22.9% of per-capita income in the study area). Then, we compute the conditional average welfare gains, which
allows us to examine the welfare impacts of each policy attribute. Our analysis shows that, even for the lower
bound of the surplus gain, the toilet provision service and the joint implementation between the government and
local NGOs have positive impacts.
This study makes four contributions to the existing literature. First, we examine the floating villages in the
northern part of Inlay Lake, Myanmar, because they are some of the most nature-dependent economies in the
world. Both the quantity and quality of the water have been deteriorating in the lake, which has increased the
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awareness and concern of those living on the lake. Individual sources of income vary within the economy, including
traditional fishing, tomato production on the floating gardens, and tourism (e.g., restaurants and hotels, boat
drivers, handcrafting, and dying and silver manufacturing). However, most depend on, or are aﬀected by the
condition of the lake water via changes in ecological services and natural resources. Moreover, compared with the
income sources, the livelihoods of the villagers depend more homogeneously on the lake water. Boats, with and
without engines, are the only means of transportation, even when visiting a neighboring house. The villagers still
use the lake water for bathing and for washing their clothes and dishes. However, the recent pollution of the lake
water has meant that drinking water and water for cooking have to be secured by a pipe from spring water reservoirs
or groundwater wells from the surrounding land, or from delivery tanks or rainwater. The source of water depends
on people’s location and wealth. As a result, 11.62% of the villagers in our sample area still drink lake water. The
lake is also a sink for human waste and garbage, although some villagers take their garbage to surrounding land
areas for burning. However, to the best of our knowledge, few studies quantify the welfare gain from water quality
improvement programs for the floating people of Inlay Lake, or for any other lakes around the world.
Second, in collaboration with the local government and a local NGO, we successfully collect an up-to-date list of
villages and all names of the household heads of Nyaung Shwe Township. Then, based on our definition of a floating
village as one where all villagers reside on the lake, we identify 17 floating villages comprising 2,284 households
and 13,794 people. From these, we randomly select 327 households.1 Since there is relatively large disparity in
population size among villages, we apply stratified random sampling by village, with sampling rates between 13.5%
and 15.0% over the 17 villages. Note that one of authors visited and met all selected households and conducted the
survey within one month. No respondents were missing from the original list of selected households. The other co-
authors participated either in the preliminary survey or the pilot survey.2 Considering the various implementation
challenges in developing countries, this ideal random sampling at the household level and the consistent survey
should minimize any sampling bias.
Third, our conjoint field experiment for collecting stated preferences over hypothetical policy alternatives follows
a new approach proposed by Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014). Conventional conjoint analyses were
introduced in the early 1970s by Green and Rao (1971), and are now widely used in various fields, including
environmental evaluation.3 However, these techniques are not based on the potential outcomes framework of causal
inference (Neyman 1923, Rubin 1974). The new method by Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014) revised the
conventional conjoint analysis in the framework of randomized experimental design in order to estimate the causal
eﬀects of a policy and its components. Using their approach, the level of attributes for each alternative are purely
randomly assigned for constructing choice sets, which allows us to identify the causal eﬀects of each attribute on
1Khin (2011) noted that there are 35 floating villages with 20,000 people. However, half of these villages include residents who are
not floating on the lake. We target only those villages where all residents reside on the lake at the time of our survey.
2The preliminary survey was conducted for six days from October 8–13, 2014, to collect 30 samples, mainly by means of interviews.
The pilot survey was conducted for 10 days from October 7–16, 2015, collecting 50 samples for the conjoint field experiment. The main
survey was conducted between December 29, 2016, and January 25, 2017.
3See Holmes and Adamowicz (2003) for the history of the conventional conjoint analysis.
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the choice decision non-parametrically. A criticism of conjoint survey experiments is their external validity, because
respondents face hypothetical choices and do not have a monetary incentive to provide their true preference.
However, Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto (2015) provided evidence that the results of the new conjoint
analyses are closely consistent with the results based on a natural experiment, which supports the external validity
of the conjoint analysis. Thus, the number of studies that use a similar approach to examine people’s preferences for
public policies is increasing. These include studies on international environmental agreements (Bechtel and Scheve
2013, Gampfer, Bernauer, and Kachi 2014, Bernauer and Gampfer 2015) and migration policies (Hainmueller and
Hopkins 2015). However, no studies apply this approach to domestic or regional environmental policies. Moreover,
all existing studies target people in developed countries or urban area of developing countries, while we focus on
the policy preferences of people in rural area of a developing country.
Lastly, and most importantly, we propose a new method of a bounded estimation of the welfare gains expected
from implementing diﬀerent proposed policy programs by expanding on the work of Bhattacharya (2015). The
new proposed conjoint analysis has been applied in the field of politics, but has yet to be applied to environmental
or development economics. Thus, our extension of the method to economic analyses, including welfare analyses,
broadens the areas within which the method can be applied. Using the conjoint experiment data, we identify the
lower bound of the impacts of a policy implementation on the welfare of village people non-parametrically.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of the water
quality of Inlay Lake. Section 3 explains our survey design, including the random sampling, the design of the
conjoint experiment and household survey, and the pilot and the main survey. Then, Section 4 provides the
theoretical grounds and modeling framework, followed by a discussion of the empirical methodologies in Section 5.
Finally, Section 6 summarizes our main findings, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Water Quality of Inlay Lake
Inlay Lake is the second largest wetland in the country (Su and Jassby 2000) and is located in Nyaung Shwe Town-
ship, Taunggyi District of Southern Shan State in Myanmar. The lake is well known by domestic and international
tourists for its rich cultural heritage and biological diversity. The Inlay Lake Wildlife Sanctuary, established in
1985, became an ASEAN Heritage Park in 2003 and part of the World Network of Biosphere Reserves of UNESCO
in 2015.
Long-term steady demographic pressure and intensifying economic activities have resulted in water quality
degradation (i.e., eutrophication), as well as associated environmental problems of the lake. The population of
Nyaung Shwe Township increased steadily from 77,000 to 189,000 between 1973 and 2014, with an average annual
growth rate of around 2.2% (Su and Jassby 2000, Ministry of Immigration and Population 2015).
As one of the main economic activities, tomato farming on the floating gardens now generates two-thirds of the
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regional agricultural production (Butkus and Myint 2001).4 Consequently, 32.4% of open surface water area, or
46.7 km², was lost between 1935 and 2000, mainly because of the development of the floating gardens (Sidle et al.
2007). The use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides to improve the productivity of tomato farming has increased,
with Butkus and Myint (2001) reporting that these were already being overused 15 years ago. Therefore, one of the
causes of eutrophication is considered to be the excessive use of fertilizers and pesticides for tomato production, yet
another is human waste disposal. Although scientific evidence through regular monitoring and/or ad-hoc research
is minimal, Akaishi et al. (2006) found that the concentrations of PO4-P, NO2-N, and NO3-N are relatively high
in the Inlay Lake water. They also found E.coli or coliform bacteria in the surface water of the lake, which can
cause diarrhea if the water is not treated before drinking. Nevertheless, some village people still use lake water as
drinking water, while most houses dispose of excretions directly into the lake. It is clear that an appropriate public
policy program for the lake is urgently needed.
In order to improve the water quality and the environment of the lake, various stakeholders including state
government departments, the local government, international organizations (e.g., donor agencies and the United
Nations), and international NGOs have been striving for conservation through programs and projects. At the same
time, local NGOs known as community-based organizations (CBOs) have been established. There are currently
approximately 20 local CBOs working on community development activities, including environmental conservation
in the Inlay Lake area. However, there has been little improvement so far in the quality of the lake water (UNDP
2014), because most activities are small and independent public awareness and training activities. Therefore, large-
scale and comprehensive countermeasures are required, including improvements in sanitary and environmental
infrastructures and regulations.
3 Survey Design and Implementation
3.1 Scenario
Water flowing into Inlay Lake through several river channels varies in terms of volume and quality, where the lake
water flows slowly downstream. When there is heavy rain in the upstream watershed, some rivers supply fresh
water, while others supply high-sediment water, which have diﬀerent impacts on the quality of the lake water. At
the same time, the spatial maldistribution of floating houses and gardens, as sources of pollutants, contributes to the
large variation in the quality of the water. Despite such hydrological complexity, there is insuﬃcient information on
the changes and variations in water quality to be able to generalize the water quality in time and space. Therefore,
the scenario of the experimental survey employs a narrative of water quality improvements, which is free from
scientific information of the respondents. The following is the scenario given to the respondents before conducting
the conjoint experiments.
4Floating gardens are large blocks of organic-rich soil brought from the wetlands around the lake (Sidle et al. 2007). These must
cope with decayed grasses, reeds, marsh plants, and aquatic plants excavated from the lake bottom.
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“We would like to propose several diﬀerent public policy programs for improving water quality of Inlay Lake. We
assume all of the proposed programs will equality bring same achievement in the water quality improvement, that is,
the improved water quality is ensured to be good for cooking anywhere and anytime in the lake but may not be good
for drinking. It should be also noted that the collected money is fully and properly used for attaining aforementioned
goal in the water quality improvement. The project is primarily implemented by local government with the collected
money”
Since the status quo of the water quality varies among respondents, the concept of improvement also varies.
However, these heterogeneous variations across respondents are captured by individual preference parameters.
3.2 Conjoint Experimental Design
There are several versions of conjoint experiment design in terms of choice set and choice making. In a version, a
choice set has two alternatives, from which a respondent must choose one. In another version, a choice set includes
a third alternative, namely maintaining the status quo, or not choosing one of the first two alternatives. Here,
there are at least two variations; one is choosing the best option and another is ranking the alternatives. From the
first dichotomous choice to the ranking, the burden on respondents is increased to allow richer information to be
collected. We confirmed from our pilot survey that respondents clearly understand the scenario and the choices.
Thus, we selected the version in which they rank three alternatives including the status quo.
Each alternative is a proposed policy program and is characterized by seven attributes. The first attribute is a
toilet system (TOILET ), with three levels. The first level oﬀers that the local government provides a toilet and a
collection tank for each house. The second level adds a collection service by the government to the first level. The
third level assumes no toilet system is provided. The second attribute is a garbage collection service (GARBAGE ),
with two levels: once-a-week collection and no service. Although diﬀerent frequencies of collection service were
tested in the pilot survey, there was not much diﬀerence in preferences across the frequencies owing to a lack of
familiarity with the service. At the same time, villagers are eager to have such services. Thus, the first level is
once a week, as the most preferred option in the pilot survey, and the second level is no garbage collection service.
The third attribute is a collective public wastewater treatment facility for dying and silver gilt (WASTEWATER),
introduced and operated by the government, with two levels: with and without the service. The original scenario
in the pilot survey had three levels, diﬀerentiating between a mandatory connection and a voluntary connection.
However, there was no significant diﬀerence between the two connections in the pilot survey. Thus, the first level
oﬀers the facility provided by the government and the second level is that no facility is provided. The fourth
attribute is government regulation and guidance on optimal fertilizer and pesticide inputs for tomato production
(FERTILIZER). This assumes a new government service for tomato farmers, from research activities on optimal
inputs of fertilizer and pesticide to regulatory guidance for farmers, based on the results of the study. The first
level assumes government services are provided only for fertilizer input, while the second level assumes they are
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only provided for pesticide inputs. The third level provides for both. Although there is no clear diﬀerence in the
preferences across the three levels in this attribute, we suspect there are heterogeneous preferences among tomato
farmers and others in the pilot survey. Thus, we decide to keep the three levels in the main survey.
In addition to the first four attributes defining diﬀerent services oﬀered by the local government, three more
attributes are added to specify the characteristics of the proposed policy programs. The first is the project period
(PERIOD), with three levels that specify the duration wherein the predetermined common narrative target is
achieved. This attribute captures respondents’ preferences on how intensively and immediately the project should
be implemented to attain the goal. The first, second, and third levels are set to 5 years, 10 years, and 20 years,
respectively. The next attribute is the implementing organizations (ORGANIZATION ), with two levels: the
government alone, and jointly with local NGOs. As mentioned earlier, it is widely accepted that third parties such
as NGOs or CBOs play a role in the public policy programs with the governments and villagers in the area. Because
it is evident that government services are not leading to suﬃciently higher expectations by the third parties, we
received a strong preference toward joint implementations between the government and local NGOs in the pilot
survey. Thus, the first level overs only government implementation, and the second level is a joint implementation.
The last attribute is payment (PAYMENT ), with three levels. The selection of payment vehicles and the range of
levels were examined carefully in the pilot survey. Initially, the pilot survey used three levels of monthly payments
during the given project period, from 3,000 Kyats 15,000 Kyats, where 3,000 Kyats is the hourly wage for unskilled
labor work in the area. The result of the pilot survey revealed that even 15,000 Kyats would not strongly discourage
the willingness to support the policy programs. As a result, we modified the range to 5,000 Kyats to 20,000 Kyats,
with four levels. It is worth mentioning that a cash donation to Buddhist temples is common practice in the study
communities. Thus, we suppose that credit liquidity is suﬃcient to employ cash payments in this study. Moreover,
our sample shows that the average household donation per month is slightly more than 20,000 Kyats, which accounts
for 6.7% of household income.
The seven attributes and their respective levels give 864 policy alternatives in total, two of which are randomly
paired to construct 432 choice sets, including the status quo (an example of a choice set is given in Appendix I).5
Each respondent is required to make a ranking decision three times for three diﬀerent choice sets. Hence, 144
households consume 432 choice sets, if each choice set is diﬀerent.6 In our survey, we repeatedly use 144 groups of
three choice sets, where each group is used either 2 or 3 times, given that we have 327 respondents.7
5That is, of the 372,816 potential pairs, 432 are selected randomly.
6The order of attributes given in the choice set is fixed, despite the literature suggesting that the order be changed randomly. However,
because this causes confusion and diﬃculty for respondents, we give priority to reducing the burden for repeated choice decisions.
7In the main survey, we use printed copies of choice sets. In the pilot survey, we used a computer. The reason for the change is that
computer screens occasionally make it diﬃcult to communicate with respondents in their houses.
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3.3 Collected Data and Sample Profile
The types of data collected from the main survey, conducted from December 27, 2016, to January 25, 2017, after
the final confirmation of the revised scenario from December 24–26, 2016, can be divided into two categories. The
first category is the choice preferences for the proposed policy programs. Here, we can further derive two types of
data from the ranking information, namely internal choices and external choices of preferences, with appropriate
coding. The internal choice of preference compares the ranking between two proposed policy programs, wherein 1
is assigned to alternative with the higher ranking, and 0 otherwise, irrespective of the ranking of the status quo.
The external choice of preference compares the ranking between the status quo and other two alternatives. Here,
1 is assigned to any policy alternative with a higher ranking than that of the status quo, and is 0 otherwise. Note
that if the ranking of the status quo is the highest or the lowest, both two alternative policy programs assign 0 or
1. One can argue that both internal and external choices of preferences have pros and cons. Obviously, the internal
choice cannot guarantee that the proposed policy alternatives are preferred over the status quo, while the preference
information between the two policy alternatives is lost in the above-mentioned cases of external choice.
The second category is household survey data, which consists of six subcategories: (1) a household roster,
whereby basic information (ethnicity, religion, age, gender, education, and job) and the mutual relations of all
family members are identified; (2) income generation, whereby the sources of household income for the last 12
months are quantified, with possible calculations including wage and working hours, quantities of production,
selling prices, necessary costs, and so on; (3) living conditions, including water supply, toilet, garbage disposal,
and health conditions; (4) durable goods, including the possession and purchasing history of major durable goods;
(5) financial conditions, such as debt, savings, and donations for the previous 12 months; and (6) environmental
awareness, which includes perceptions on recent changes in the quality of the lake water, as well as three major
causes from a given list and respondents’ level of understanding of the scenario for conjoint experiment.
The characteristics of our sample data from the 327 households are as follows. Slightly more than half of all
respondents are female (51.38%) and the average age is 44.7 years. Nearly 60% of the household heads completed
up to a primary level of education (59.33%), 21.10% completed up to middle school, and 3.98% and 1.83% are high
school and collage/university graduates, respectively, whereas 13.76% are illiterate. Family size ranges from 1 to
11, with an average size of 4.7. The total annual household income ranges from 360,000 Kyats (300 USD) to 21.6
million Kyats (18,000 USD), with an average of 3.6 million Kyats (3,000 USD). Moreover, the average per capita
income is 840,000 Kyats (700 USD), with a range of between 158,000 Kyats (131 USD) and 5.4 million Kyats (4,500
USD).
[Table 1 around here]
In all, 43.43% of household heads are engaged in farming, and typically tomato production (see Table 1). In
Inlay areas, farmers cultivate tomatoes for six months, starting from March or April, and do other jobs for the
rest of the year, such as fishing, carpentry, and seasonal jobs. Although tomatoes can be harvested after 40 days
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from shedding seeds, farmers divide their floating gardens into blocks, and seeding and harvesting are scheduled
to be repeated every 6 weeks to 14 weeks. Thus, farmers are usually engaged in tomato farming for six months.
It is specially noted that in 2015, tomato production in the delta region in the south of the country, which is a
competitor of Inlay tomatoes, was severely damaged by flooding. As a result, tomatoes from Inlay enjoyed higher
prices, approximately double the usual price, which inflates our income statistics. On the other hand, fishing is
more common as a secondary job (77 household heads) than as a primary job (44 household heads). Fishing used
to be a high-income source in the past, but fishery resources have decreased, particularly the Inlay carp (Cyprinus
Carpio Intha), known locally as nga-phein, which have diminished owing to sedimentation and eutrophication (Su
and Jassby 2000).
[Table 2 around here]
In addition to the job structure of household heads, Table 2 summarizes the total household income by source.
Because household heads and other household members usually have multiple jobs, it is important to know the
economic implications of these jobs. From our survey sample, we aggregate all income sources from all sample
households. The economic significance of farming is the largest, with 36.13% of the total, which is lower than
the share of farming in the primary jobs of household heads (43.4%). This gap implies a diversification of income
sources. Although fishing was replaced by tomato farming, approximately 15% of income is still generated by
fishing. Relatively few villagers engage in small businesses, but these generate relatively large profits (around 10%).
In contrast, 85 households (26%) generate income from local cheroot cigarette businesses as a main supplementary
income source. However, this contributes only 5% of income, even though it is a prevailing activity.
[Table 3 around here]
The respondents are asked to give their perception of recent (the last five years) changes in the water quality
of Inlay Lake. The results show that 48% of respondents perceive that the water quality of the lake is significantly
worse, while 4.9% perceive no change, or that it has improved.
[Table 4 around here]
Table 4 summarizes the major suspected causes of water quality deterioration of Inlay Lake. During the prelim-
inary survey and the pilot survey, we collected possible causes of water quality deterioration from the villagers, the
local government, and local NGOs. Ten major water pollution causes were presented to the respondents, of which
they needed to select at most three. The respondents provided multiple causes, with an average number of 2.48.
Thus, they believe there are more than two possible causes jointly aﬀecting the water quality. Two of the major
causes, identified in more than half the cases, are the direct discharge of wastewater and night soil, and the use of
fertilizer and pesticide for tomato production. Thus, respondents understand that they are causing the pollution.
At the same time, respondents are also concerned about water scarcity and sedimentation from various indirect
causes, such as forest degradation and climate change. As a source of pollution, few respondents believe that people
living upstream are causing the pollution.
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4 Conceptual Framework
We show a simple model to illustrate the welfare implications from the choice data. The structural choice probability
is first defined based on a simple, but therefore robust choice model, which is a key concept in examining the welfare
implications. We then show that the welfare gain from a policy implementation can be recovered from the structural
choice probability.
4.1 Choice model
Let us consider a policy consisted by n attributes. The utility of an individual i without policies, refereed as the
status quo utility, is denoted by U0(ηi) where ηi is a preference parameter. The utility of an individual i under a
water improving policy is denoted by
U(C,A, ηi),
where C is the individual burden to implement the policy, and A = [A1, A2, ..., An] is a vector of attributes that
are discrete. We naturally assume following properties of the utility function;
Assumption 1: For any A and ηi,U(C,A, ηi) is a continuous and decreasing function of C.
Assumption 2: For any A and ηi,U(C,A, ηi)→ −∞ if C →∞, and U(0,A, ηi) ≥ U0(ηi).
Assumption 1 implies that no individual prefer higher burden, and the continuity is needed to ensure the existence
of the willingness-to-pay. Assumption 2 requires that individuals do not prefer to implement a policy with infinitely
high burden and must prefer8 to implement a policy with zero burden. This assumption is also needed to ensure
the existence of the willingness-to-pay.
A policy is preferred than status quo if and only if
U(C,A, ηi) ≥ U0(ηi),
The choice probability of a policy rather than status quo can be then defined as
q(c,a) = Pr[U(c,A, ηi) ≥ U0(ηi)|A = a],
where c and a are realized values of C and A. Note that q(c,a) is referred as the structural choice probability in
Bhattacharya (2015).
We can additionally define the marginal structural choice probability as
Q(c) =
∑
a
Pr[U(c,A, ηi) ≥ U0(ηi)|A = a]× p(A = a). (1)
8We abbreviate the term “weakly” here and after.
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where p(A = a) is the joint distribution of the profile attributes. In the choice experiment of the current paper,
the joint distribution is specified as the joint uniform distribution.
The conditional structural choice probabilities are also defined as
Q(c|Al = al) =
∑
a−l
Pr[U(c,A, ηi) ≥ U0(ηi)|A−l = a−l]× p(A−l = a−l). (2)
Note that because levels of attributes are independently determined in our choice experiment, p(A−l = a−l|Al =
al) = p(A−l = a−l).
Note that Q(c) and Q(c|Al = al) can be estimated easily from the choice experiment data. Therefore, equations
(1) and (2) provide interpretations of the estimated structural probabilities which are the share of individuals who
prefer to implement a policy than to maintain the status quo.
4.2 Welfare gain
We now define the willingness-to-pay (WP), CWP (A, ηi), under which an individual i is indiﬀerent between a policy
implementation and status quo. Formally, CWP (A, ηi) can be defined as
U(CWP (A, ηi),A, ηi) = U0(ηi).
Note that Assumption 1 and 2 ensure the existence of CWP (A, ηi). Moreover, Assumption 2 implies that for any
A, CWP (A, ηi) ≥ 0.
It is diﬃcult to estimate the admissible burden of each individual, while focusing on estimating the distribution
and summary statistics. The cumulative distribution function of the willingness-to-pay can be defined as
FWP (C|A = a) = Pr[CWP (A, ηi) ≤ C|A = a].
Assumption 1 implies thatU0(ηi) = U(CWP (A, ηi),A, ηi) ≥ U(C,A, ηi) if and only if C ≥ CWP (A, ηi). Thus, the
above distribution can be rewritten as
FWP (C|A = a) = Pr[U0(ηi) ≥ U(C,a, ηi)|A = a],
and the marginal distribution function can be defined as
FWP (C)) =
∑
a
Pr[U0(ηi) ≥ U(C,a, ηi)|A = a]× p(A = a)
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Combining this with the structural choice probabilities, equations (1) and (2), yields
FWP (C) = 1−Q(c), (3)
and
FWP (C|Al = al) = 1−Q(c|Al = al). (4)
Equations (3) and (4) imply that the structural choice probabilities are suﬃcient statistics to recover the distribution
of the willingness-to-pay.
Summarized statistics of the willingness-to-pay distribution can be also recovered by the structural choice prob-
ability. The marginal average willingness-to-pay is obtained as
E[C] =
ˆ ∞
0
CdFWP (C) =
ˆ ∞
0
Cd[1−Q(c)]. (5)
and the conditional average willingness-to-pay is obtained as
E[C|Al = al] =
ˆ ∞
0
CdFWP (C|Al = al) =
ˆ ∞
0
Cd[1−Q(c|Al = al)], (6)
where
Q(c) =
∑
a
Pr[U(c,A, ηi) ≥ U0(ηi)|Al = al,A−l = a−l]× p(A−l = a−l)
and similarly is for Q(c|Al = al). Note that the average willingness-to-pay can be interpreted as a monetary
measurement of the welfare gain from a policy implementation.
The above discussion implies that we can identify the monetary welfare gain from the choice experiment data.
In particular, if we can identify Q(c) and Q(c|Al = al) for any c, the monetary welfare gain is point-identified.
However, our experiment data only provide estimators of the structural choice probabilities at 5,000, 10,000, 15,000,
and 20,000 Kyats. This makes it diﬃcult to obtain non-parametric point-estimators of the monetary welfare gain.
Alternatively, the next section shows that we can identify the lower bound of the welfare gain in a straightforward
manner.
4.3 Partial identification
The marginal and conditional average willingness-to-pay (equation 5) can be rewritten as
E[C] =
k∑
i=0
ˆ ci+1
ci
Cd[1−Q(c)]
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where ci is the ith threshold value for c, k is the number of threshold values, and c0 = 0 and ck+1 =∞. In our case
k = 4, and c1 = 5, 000, c2 = 10, 000, c3 = 15, 000, and c4 = 20, 000. Note that Ui(0,A, ηi) ≥ Ui(ηi) in Assumption
2 ensures that the minimum willingness-to-pay must be positive.
By using the mean-value theorem, above equation can be further modified as
E[C] =
k∑
i=0
c˜i [Q (ci)−Q (ci+1)]
for some c˜i ∈ [ci, ci+1] for any i = 0, . . . , k.9 Since Q is monotonically decreasing in c, terms in the square brackets
are together positive, and therefore letting c˜i simply be ci yields the lower bound of the marginal average welfare
gain say C as
C =
k∑
i=0
ci [Q (ci)−Q (ci+1)] . (7)
Similarly, from equation (6), the lower bound of the conditional average welfare gain, say C|Al=al is also obtained
as
C|Al=al =
k∑
i=0
ci [Q (ci|Al = al)−Q (ci+1|Al = al)] . (8)
Equations (7) and (8) imply that lower bounds of both marginal and conditional welfare gain can be identified by
using estimators of choice probabilities because these equations include no other unknown parameters10.
5 Estimation Strategies
This section shows two types of estimation strategies. The first strategy is to estimate the causal eﬀects of each
attribute on the choice probabilities. The second is to estimate the welfare gain from a policy implementation.
5.1 Estimation of causal eﬀects on choice probabilities
The choice experiment data allow us to estimate the causal eﬀects on two types of choice probability. The first type
of probability is that a policy is preferred to the other policy. The second is the probability that a policy is preferred
to the status quo. We refer to the first as the internal probability, and to the second as the external probability.
To implement the estimations on the internal and external probabilities, a la Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Ya-
mamoto (2014), we estimate the following population model;
yitj = β0 +
7∑
l=1
Dl∑
d=2
βld × aitjld + uitj , (9)
where aitjld is a dummy variable for the l -th level of an attribute l of a policy j in task t of a respondent i, Dl is
9Note that Q (c0) = Q (0) = 1 and Q (ck+1) = Q (∞) = 0.
10Unfortunately, an upper bound derived in this manner involves a parameter ck+1 is infinity. Therefore, in the following analysis,
we focus on estimating the lower bound of the welfare gain.
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the number of levels of an attributes l, βld is its coeﬃcient, and uitj denote the error terms. Then yitj ∈ {0, 1} is a
choice indicator variable: for the estimation of the internal probability, yitj = 1 if the preference rank of policy j is
higher than it’s alternative policy. In the estimation on the external probability, yitj = 1 if the preference rank of
a policy j is higher than status quo.
Note that the unit of analysis in the regression is each alternative in each task of each respondent. Therefore, even
though respondents are sampled randomly from the population, the observed choice outcomes within a respondent
may be correlated, which may mislead the statistical inference results. For example, respondents have unobservable
characteristics that aﬀect their answer in every task, which generates a correlation of choice outcome within a
respondent. To avoid the bias from such correlation in the error terms, we use the cluster robust standard error at
the respondent level in all regressions, as suggested by Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014).
The approach of Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014) has two advantages. The first is that the as-
sumption of conditional independency, E[uitj |aitj1, ..., aitj7] = 0, must hold, because attributes are purely randomly
ordered for each respondent. The second advantage is that we can estimate the causal eﬀects non-parametrically,
because all explanation variables (aitjld) are dummy variables. Therefore, the estimated coeﬃcients, βˆi, are con-
sistent estimators of the causal eﬀects. This allows us to compare the relative sizes of the estimated coeﬃcients to
examine the relative eﬀectiveness of each attribute.
5.2 Estimation of welfare gains
To estimate the lower bound of the marginal average welfare gain, equation (7) implies that we need to estimate
the structural choice probabilities of a policy. The estimated marginal choice probabilities can be obtained by the
regression on
yitj = γ0 + γ15000 × aitj15000 + γ10000 × aitj10000 + γ5000 × aitj5000 + vitj ,
where aitj15000, aitj10000, and aitj5000 are dummy variables for the policy burdens as 15,000 Kyats, 10,000 Kyats,
and 5,000 Kyats, respectively; γ10000, γ15000, and γ5000 are their coeﬃcients; vitj are the error terms; and yitj is an
indicator variable. Here, yitj = 1 implies that the preference rank of policy j is higher than that of the status quo
option. Using estimated coeﬃcients, the estimators of the marginal structural choice probabilities are obtained as
Qˆ(5000) = γˆ0+ γˆ5000, Qˆ(10000) = γˆ0+ γˆ10000, Qˆ(15000) = γˆ0+ γˆ15000, and Qˆ(20000) = γˆ0, where a hat (^) implies
an estimated coeﬃcient.
Equation (7) then yields the estimator of the lower bound as follows:
Cˆ = 5000× [Qˆ(5000)− Qˆ(10000)] + 10000× [Qˆ(10000)− Qˆ(15000)]
+15000× [Qˆ(15000)− Qˆ(20000)] + 20000× Qˆ(20000)
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= 5000× (γˆ5000 + γˆ10000 + γˆ15000) + 20000× γˆ0. (10)
Similarly, the conditional choice probabilities can be estimated by the regression on
yitj = γ
dl
0 + γ
dl
15000 × adl itj15000 + γdl10000 × aitj10000 + γdl5000 × aitj5000 + vdlitj ,
using the sub samples consisting of alternatives with Al = al. Equation (8) yields the estimator of the lower bound
of the conditional average welfare gain, as follows:
Cˆ
∣∣∣
Al=al
= 5000× (γˆdl5000 + γˆdl10000 + γˆdl15000) + 20000× γˆdl0 . (11)
The above equations imply that the estimated average welfare gain is naturally an increasing function of a constant
term and the coeﬃcients.
6 Estimation Results
This section first presents the estimation results of the causal eﬀects of each componet of the policy on its choice
probabilites, and then shows the estimated welfare gain. The choice probabilities are furher divided into those that
are internal and external, as discussed above, and separately discussed in the following sections.
6.1 Results of choice probabilities
Figures 1 and 2 report the estimated coeﬃcients and the 95% confidence intervals in population model (9) of the
internal and external choice probabilities, respectively. Each solid circle in the figure represents a point estimator,
while the horizontal bar is the 95% confidence interval. Note that the full results table can be found in Appendix
II.11
Internal choice probability
[Figure 1 around here]
With regard to the internal probability, Figure 1 shows that TOILET, GARBAGE, and WASTEWATER have
positive and statistically significant eﬀects, while no significant eﬀects of FERTILIZER are observed. PERIOD and
PAYMENT also have natural estimated eﬀects: a lower burden and a shorter targeting period have positive causal
eﬀects on the internal choice probabilities.
An important advantage of a randomized conjoint design is that it allows us to conduct causal interpretations
for all estimated coeﬃcients, which implies that we can compare the economic significance of the attributes. Among
11Note that for both internal and external choice probabilities, we estimate the interaction eﬀects between pairs of attributes. However,
we find no clear evidence of the existence of interaction eﬀects.
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the additional services, the causal eﬀect of TOILET is especially high, with a size roughly the same as the eﬀect of
reducing the financial burden from 20,000 Kyats to 5,000 Kyats, or reducing the target period from 20 years to 5
years. Thus, Figure 1 shows the high demand for a toilet service, which implies that a water improvement project,
including toilet service, would have more support from the local communities. Additionally, a collective wastewater
treatment facility and garbage collection services are an eﬀective way to get people’s support, but there is no
statistical evidence for the eﬀectiveness of an agricultural service, as indicated by the estimate on FERTILIZER.
Our results show the relevance of the operators. The results for ORGANIZATION show that a joint imple-
mentation by the government and local NGOs significantly improves the internal choice probability. Moreover, its
economic significance is high because the estimated eﬀect of a joint implementation with local NGOs is roughly the
same as the eﬀect of cutting the burden or the target period to half, namely, from 20,000 Kyats to 10,000 Kyats,
or from 20 years to 10 years. Therefore, our estimation results imply that local NGOs can play an important role
in providing local community support for water improvement projects.
External choice probability
[Figure 2 around here]
From Figure 2, we can observe that the causal eﬀects on the external choice probability have similar trends to
those on the internal choice probability, although the sizes of the eﬀects tend to be smaller than in the case of the
internal choice probability. A potential reason for this is that, irrespective of its characteristics, the respondents
wish to have the proposed policy program (see the coeﬃcient of the constant term in Table A2 in Appendix). Hence,
the estimated coeﬃcients of the attributes become smaller because the variation in the outcome variables is smaller
than in the case of the estimation of the external choice probability.
Even on the external choice probability, TOILET and WASTEWATER still have significant eﬀects, and the
toilet service again has a larger eﬀects than the other services do. Furthermore, a policy implementation with local
NGOs still has positive eﬀects at the 10% significance level (see Table A2 in Appendix).
The burden and targeting periods show similar trends. A smaller burden and a shorter period can increase the
choice probabilities. Note that the point estimators of individual burdens are not monotonically increasing because
the estimated coeﬃcient of 10,000 Kyats is lower than the coeﬃcient of 15,000 Kyats. However, the results do not
imply that the external choice probability decreases if the individual burden decreases from 15,000 Kyats to 10,000
Kyats because the diﬀerence between these coeﬃcients is not statistically significant.
6.2 Results of the welfare
Table 5 reports the estimated lower bound of the welfare gain from a policy implementation as in equation (7). The
first low shows the estimated lower bound of the marginal average welfare gain as 16,090 Kyats in each month, or
193,082 Kyats annually. Because the average annual per-capita income in the area is 840,000 Kyats, the estimated
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average willingness-to-pay is at least 22.9% of the average annual per-capita income.
The other rows show the estimated lower bound of the conditional average welfare gain. Among the additional
services, the average surplus gain from water improvement projects with toilet service (Toilet and Toilet and
Collection) is the highest. The diﬀerence in the surplus gains with and without the toilet service (Toilet) is more
than 2,000 Kyats per month, which implies that the lower bound can be improved by about 14% by introducing
toilets.
Table 5 consistently shows that including local NGOs has a significant welfare impact. The diﬀerence in the
lower bound with and without local NGOs is about 760 Kyats per month, which is about a 5% improvement in the
welfare gain.
7 Conclusion
This study examined the preference for a water improvement policy for Inlay Lake, Myanmar, based on a randomized
conjoint experiment. We have shown that the additional service of providing toilet facilities has a strong positive
eﬀects on both the internal and external choice probabilities for a policy. Furthermore, a collective wastewater
treatment for dying and silver manufacturing and the collection of household garbage are also estimated to increase
the choice probabilities. In contrast to the consistent results showing respondents’ perceptions of toilets being the
cause of the pollution, the government intervention to regulate and optimize excess fertilizer and pesticide inputs for
tomato production does not have agreement among the respondents. Here, we might need to examine the complex
heterogeneous structure of respondents’ preferences to better understand this result. The varying preferences may
simply stem from the diﬀerences between being engaged in tomato farming or not, or the degree of dependency of a
family’s income on tomato farming. Our interaction with tomato farmers during our field visits showed that some
clearly understand that if fertilizer and pesticide inputs can be optimized, they can save on production costs and
improve their long-term productivity. However, others do not understand and/or do not like the idea of government
intervention. This implies that knowledge and skill in terms of fertilizer and pesticide inputs will be needed by all
farmers if the related public policy program is to be supported widely.
Another contribution of this study is methodological. We have shown that conjoint data can be used to draw
out welfare implications non-parametrically. Using only weak assumptions, the method enables us to estimate the
minimum willingness-to-pay for a policy change in the form of compensating variations. This method can be applied
to environment improvement project evaluations that are otherwise diﬃcult to estimate. Adopting this method to
Inlay Lake, we conclude that the water quality improvement policy has a marginal average surplus gain of at least
193,082 Kyats per annul, which is 22.9% of the average annual per-capita income in the area. Additionally, the
analysis of the conditional average surplus gain shows that including the toilet service increases the lower bound
of the surplus gain by 14%. The analyses of the choice probabilities and the surplus gain show the importance of
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providing a toilet service when implementing a water quality improvement policy.
Our analysis also shows the importance of the role played by local NGOs. A joint policy implementation by
the government and local NGOs has positive impacts on the internal and external choice probabilities, which are
similar in size to the monthly burden reduction from 20,000 Kyats to 10,000 Kyats. Then, we estimated the welfare
impacts of local NGOs, showing that the lower bound of the conditional average surplus gain increases by 5%.
We believe that our findings have important implications for future policy plans to improve the water quality
of Inlay Lake. However, our study has an important limitation in terms of the external validity of the randomized
conjoint analysis. Even though Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto (2015) provide evidence for this validity
in developed countries, no studies focus on developing countries. Therefore, additional studies are needed to test
the external validity of the conjoint experiments in developing countries.
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Figure 1: Average causal effects on the internal choice probability 
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Figure 2: Average causal effects on the external choice 
probability 
Number of
household
heads
Composition
(%)
Number of
household
heads
Composition
(%)
Farmer 142 43.4% Fisher 77 23.5%
Fisher 44 13.5% Wage worker for farming 22 6.7%
Wage worker for farming 27 8.3% Shopkeeper 18 5.5%
Carpenter 26 8.0% Farmer 7 2.1%
Local cheroot 10 3.1% Boat driver 5 1.5%
Small business 8 2.4% Wage work for tailoring 5 1.5%
Shopkeeper 7 2.1% Small business 3 0.9%
Trader/Broker 6 1.8%
Various others 26 8.0% Various others 44 13.5%
No primary jobs 31 9.5% No secondary jobs 146 44.6%
Total 327 100.0% 327 100.0%
Primary Secondary 
Table 1: Distribution of Major Primary and Secondary Jobs for Household Heads.
Source Composition (%)
Farming 36.13
Fishing 15.30
Small business 10.01
Carpenter 6.09
Wage work for farming 6.39
Local cheroot 5.22
Trader/Broker 4.08
Wage work for tailoring 4.05
Boat driver 2.00
Various others 10.73
Total 100.00
Table 2: Distribution of total household income by source.
Perception Numbers of
respondents
Composition (%)
Seriously worsening 157 48.01
Worsening 153 46.79
Not changing 14 4.28
Improving 2 0.61
Don’t know 1 0.31
Total (%) 327 100.00
Table 3: Perception of recent changes in the water quality
Perception Numbers of
suspected causes
Composition (%) Rate of selection (%)
Waste water and night soil (on the lake) 198 24.4% 60.6%
Fertilizer and pesticide (on the lake) 166 20.4% 50.8%
Forest degradation and sedimentation 145 17.9% 44.3%
Climate change 83 10.2% 25.4%
Tourism 66 8.1% 20.2%
Dam construction and operation 42 5.2% 12.8%
Fertilizer and pesticide (in the watershed) 22 2.7% 6.7%
Waste water and night soil (in the watershed) 18 2.2% 5.5%
Demolished floating garden 9 1.1% 2.8%
Others 63 7.8% 19.3%
Number of suspected causes 812 100.0%
Number of suspected causes per respondent 2.48
Table 4: Reasons for the water quality change
Average walfare gain Attribute Point estimator S.D p-value Annual gain
Baseline 16,090 315 0.00 15,471 16,709 193,082
Conditional TOILET 14,667 481 0.00 13,720 15,615 176,007
16,908 349 0.00 16,220 17,595 202,893
16,715 369 0.00 15,989 17,441 200,583
GARBAGE 15,802 357 0.00 15,099 16,505 189,627
16,375 368 0.00 15,650 17,100 196,498
WASTEWATER 15,537 395 0.00 14,759 16,315 186,438
16,623 325 0.00 15,983 17,264 199,482
FERTILIZER 16,477 383 0.00 15,724 17,231 197,726
16,149 399 0.00 15,364 16,934 193,786
15,653 426 0.00 14,814 16,493 187,841
PERIOD 15,483 439 0.00 14,619 16,348 185,802
15,908 404 0.00 15,112 16,703 190,892
16,861 380 0.00 16,114 17,609 202,337
ORGANIZATION 15,708 397 0.00 14,926 16,489 188,491
16,468 353 0.00 15,774 17,162 197,618
10 year
5 year
Government
Government and local NGOs
Table 5: Average surplus gains from policy implmentation
20 year
95% Confidence Interval
No Wastewater Treatment
Wastewater Treatment
Toilet
Toilet and Collection
No Toilet
No Garbage Collection
Garbage Collection
Fertilizer
Pesticide
Fertilizer and Pesticide
Level
Respondent No.
1 Choice Code Choice Code
The 1st trial 264 476
Choice A Choice B Choice C
Attribute 1 Toilet system
(Toilet, septic tank, collection services are all provided
by the government)
Toilet + Tank
(but not collection service) Toilet + Tank + Collection Service
Attribute 2 Garbage collection services
(Garbage collection services are provided by the
government)
not available not available
Attribute 3 Public water treatment facility for the dying industry
(the facility is constructed by the government and
operational and maintenance costs are paid by the
industry)
not available Introduced
Attribute 4 Mondatory optimal inputs of fertilizer and pesticide for
tomato plantation
(to achieve this, costs for governement research and
guidance activities are required)
Mondatory optimal inputs of
fertilizer and necessary guidance
Mondatory optimal inputs of
fertilizer and necessary guidance
Attribute 5 Period for the target of water quality improvements to
be attained
(The water qualtiy in front of individual house will be
improved to the current level of northan part of the Inle
lake)
20 years 20 years
Attribute 6 Implementation organization Local government with supports of
local NGOs Local government
Attribute 7 Montly payment for the period until the water quality
target is achieved
20000 Kyats 20000 Kyats
Table A1: Example of Choice Set Screen
Do not choose A
and B
Attribute VARIABLES Internal External
TOILET Providing Toilet with Tank 0.113*** 0.247***
-0.0226 -0.0256
Providing Toilet with Tank and Collection service 0.103*** 0.226***
-0.0235 -0.0253
GARBAGE Garbage Collection service 0.0292 0.0755***
-0.0177 -0.0222
WASTEWATER Wastewater Treatment Facility 0.0556*** 0.0646***
-0.0177 -0.0203
FERTILIZER Fertilizer -0.0162 -0.0159
-0.022 -0.0281
Fertilizer and Pesticide -0.0405* 0.0278
-0.021 -0.027
PERIOD 10 year 0.0197 0.128***
-0.0229 -0.025
5 year 0.0678*** 0.224***
-0.0226 -0.026
ORGANIZATION Government and local NGOs 0.0371* 0.123***
-0.0201 -0.0205
PAYMENT 15,000 Kyats 0.106*** 0.0725**
-0.0272 -0.0316
10,000 Kyats 0.0676** 0.126***
-0.0269 -0.0305
5,000 Kyats 0.162*** 0.190***
-0.0269 -0.0303
Constant 0.577*** -0.00749
-0.0418 -0.0343
Observations 1,962 1,962
R-squared 0.054 0.131
Note. Outcome variable: the internal choice probability in the first column, and the external choice probability in
the second column. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on respondent. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
Table A2: Estimated effects on internal and external probabilities
